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The formation of structured cooperative communities
Public goods cooperation
A society relying upon public goods must avoid a tragedy of 
the commons; it will otherwise wither owing to the collapse of 
cooperative enterprises. This long recognized phenomenon 
has repeatedly caught the attention of thinkers across a 
variety of fields. Game theory has, through stylized 
quantitative models, served to unfold core processes 
governing the nature of cooperation on public goods. While 
caught between oversimplification and intractability, research 
is pushing to understand cooperation in complex systems.
Large organizational units, such as whole communities, are 
typically subdivided into a multitude of different localized 
groups between which individuals may transfer. Although the 
group structure of such heterogeneous units is known to be 
important to the success of cooperation, knowledge on how 
group structures dynamically unfold and develop jointly with 
cooperative efforts is limited. 
Inter­group migration behavior
Public economist Charles Tiebout suggested in 1956 that foot
voting as an inter­group migration behavior could constitute a
powerful bottom­up solution to the free­rider problem in local
governance, as he believed that large communities would
self­organize into an optimal type of group­structure.
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Structured cooperative communities
We apply evolutionary game theory to social group­formation, 
and find that foot voting spontaneously emerges in large self­
organized, public­goods communities. In turn, the emergence 
of foot voting makes way for cooperation to develop in non­
cooperative communities which transform into highly 
cooperative group­structured societies. As such, the Tiebout 
hypothesis gets support in evolutionary game theory, and at 
the same time is revealed as an example of a wider concept, 
as it builds on a sorting principle that appears inevitable and 
that may represent a general mechanism for triggering 
invasion of altruism, potentially at many, and much more 
basic, levels of social and biological organization.
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